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ROBERT C. POST*
Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory
dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes
despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all. Jeffrey Rosen's courage in
eloquently addressing the subject with the sweep and vigor evident in The
Unwanted Gaze is entirely admirable.' He has composed a rich and useful book,
filled with perceptive observations and nuggets of sound advice. But as to
capturing the core concept of privacy itself, I find myself cautious and reserved.
In this brief Review Essay, I shall isolate and review three different and in
some respects incompatible concepts of privacy that are each mentioned in the
Prologue to The Unwanted Gaze. The first connects privacy to the creation of
knowledge; the second connects privacy to dignity; and the third connects
privacy to freedom. I shall argue that the first concept should not be understood
as a question of privacy; that the second is a helpful way of apprehending
privacy, but that it should focus our attention primarily upon forms of social
structure; and that the third is best conceived as an argument for liberal
limitations on government regulation.
Rosen introduces the first sense of privacy early in the Prologue when he
seeks to explain the "sense of violation ' 2 that Monica Lewinsky undoubtedly
experienced when her "consensual sexual activities"' 3 were forcibly made pub-
lic. Rosen argues that "a central value of privacy" is to protect persons "from
being misdefined and judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a
world in which information can easily be confused with knowledge.",4 Rosen
argues that Lewinsky, like any normal person, would feel violated if she were
"misjudged on the basis of [her] most embarrassing, and therefore most memo-
rable, tastes and preferences." 5 Rosen continues:
Monica Lewinsky didn't mind that her friends knew she had given the
President a copy of Nicholson Baker's Vox, because her friends knew that she
was much more than the type of person who would read a book about phone
sex. But when our reading habits or private e-mails are exposed to strangers,
we may be reduced, in the public eye, to nothing more than the most salacious
book we once read or the most vulgar joke we once told.6
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1. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: TE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000).
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id. at 9.
6. Id.
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Rosen contrasts the superficial knowledge of the public to the "true knowledge
of another person, in all of his or her complexity" which "can only be achieved
with a handful of friends, lovers, or family members.",7 "[I]nformation wrenched
out of context is no substitute for the genuine knowledge that can only emerge
slowly over time."8
There is no doubt that Rosen has accurately and eloquently identified a real
social concern. We can all empathize with Lewinksy's distress at being misunder-
stood by the public. The question, however, is whether this distress relates to the
concept of privacy. Misrepresentation in the public eye is independently distress-
ing whenever it occurs, regardless of whether it is caused by the revelation of
"private" facts. If a competent professional athlete becomes stereotyped and
misjudged on the basis of a single bonehead play, he suffers an injury analogous
to Lewinsky's, even though his error may have been committed in the full view
of a packed football stadium. The risk of misperception is endemic to public
life; it is built into the very sociology of public understanding. How, then, does
it relate to the specific value of privacy?
At the most general level, Rosen seeks to situate an account of privacy within
the field of knowledge. Privacy, he suggests, blocks the flow of information in
order to avoid error and misrepresentation. This view of privacy surfaces
throughout The Unwanted Gaze. It is an odd view, however, because knowledge
is necessarily dependent upon information.
All knowledge, even intimate knowledge about friends and lovers, alters in
response to new information. To interrupt the flow of information is to short-
circuit the formation of knowledge. We therefore cannot set up an opposition
between information and "true knowledge," for in human life all knowledge is
provisional and uncertain. All things being equal, those with more information
will have more secure knowledge. The more information released about Lewin-
sky, the better the public will understand her. If the public has reason to learn
about the Lewinsky affair, the fact that the public will never understand
Lewinsky as deeply or as comprehensively as her mother cannot be a reason to
prevent public disclosure.
Perhaps, then, Rosen means to suggest that privacy protects against certain
typical and unfortunate errors in the creation of knowledge. Privacy prevents
the disclosure of the kind of information that cannot be adequately understood
in the absence of special circumstances, like intimacy. To pursue this line of
analysis, however, we must distinguish between two foci of concern. The first
imagines the function of privacy as preventing cognitive errors by persons who
seek to acquire knowledge; the second imagines privacy as protecting persons
who are the subject of information from misrepresentation.
Rosen adopts the first focus when he speaks of privacy as analogous to rules
of evidence in a courtroom that preclude the introduction of inflammatory
7. Id. at 8.
8. Id. at 10.
2088 [Vol. 89:2087
HeinOnline -- 89 Geo. L.J. 2088 2000-2001
THREE CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY
information that might confuse or mislead a jury. Rosen notes that "when
prurient information is introduced in court, it can distract jurors and the public
at large, leading them to judge the accuser and the accused on the basis of
embarrassing past acts rather than their guilt or innocence of the charges in
question." 9 Rosen interprets Warren and Brandeis as arguing that "prurient
information is so luridly interesting that, when widely publicized, it crowds out
all other topics of public discussion, making it difficult to think or talk about
anything else."' Privacy thus safeguards "the public's interest in not being
distracted by prurience.""l
Once again, Rosen has identified an important social concern. The question is
its relationship to the value of privacy. Prurience, after all, can be public or
private. If Clinton had an overt affair with Lewinsky, it would be equally
distracting to the public as a private affair. Conversely, many of the details of
Clinton's private life are not distracting, but merely boring and uninteresting.
The general point is that the distinction between distracting and pertinent
information does not align with the distinction between public and private
information. The distinction between distracting and pertinent information would
seem instead to turn entirely on the purpose for which the information is
required. Information about my private sex life might be merely distracting to
the editor of my book, but it may be highly pertinent to my psychoanalyst.
Judicial decisions to exclude inflammatory evidence follow this logic. Judges
typically weigh the relevance of evidence against its likelihood to mislead.
Judges do not exclude information merely because it is private. Evidence of
improprieties in my private bank records might be excluded from litigation
involving a car accident, but not from litigation involving financial fraud. The
operative question is not whether the information is private, but whether it is
relevant to the decision at hand. Similarly, when judges decide whether evi-
dence is sufficiently inflammatory or prejudicial to be excluded, their decision
does not depend upon whether the evidence concerns public or private informa-
tion. Evidence of past crimes, which is undoubtedly public, is typically ex-
cluded as potentially prejudicial.
When Rosen contends that the public ought to be protected from information
about the private sex lives of public officials, he constructs an argument that is
analogous to that which supports the exclusion of evidence in a trial. If our
analysis so far has been correct, however, he is not actually making an argument
about privacy, but about the pertinence of this information for public delibera-
tion. This pertinence is independent of the privacy of the information. I take it
that no one would contend that the public ought to be protected from informa-
tion revealing that the President was engaged in sexual relations with a North
Korean spy, regardless of whether this information might in other contexts be
9. Id. at 156.
10. Id. at 142.
11. Id. at 158.
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deemed private. The conclusion that the President's private life is merely
distracting to the public must ultimately be defended on the grounds that such
information is not pertinent to an evaluation of the President. This is not a
question of privacy. It is instead a particular account of the role and responsibili-
ties of the Presidency, and, therefore, of the grounds upon which he may be
rendered accountable to the public.
I should add that for the past forty years the First Amendment has been
interpreted to stand for the proposition that only the public can determine
whether information is relevant or irrelevant for the evaluation of public
officials. No legislation or judicial decree can advance a particular conception
of the proper role of public officials as a basis for excluding information from
public discourse as "irrelevant." This point fits nicely, within a larger theme of
The Unwanted Gaze, which is "the superiority of norms over law in protecting
privacy."' 2 Even if particular conceptions of the responsibilities of public office
cannot be imposed by law, they can nevertheless be advocated by prominent
authors, like Rosen. No doubt we would all be better off if Rosen's sense of
official role, which supports a stronger distinction between public and private
behavior, became more influential within public discourse.
If the value of privacy does not correspond well with the concern of prevent-
ing cognitive errors by persons who seek to acquire knowledge, perhaps it fits
better with the concern of protecting persons from misrepresentation. Rosen
reiterates this theme throughout The Unwanted Gaze. He concludes the book,
for example, by stressing "the importance of maintaining private spaces to
protect individuals from being judged out of context in a world of fleeting
attention spans." 13 "All Americans," Rosen insists, "are entitled to be regarded
as self-defining individuals rather than as prisoners of sexual stereotypes and
generalizations." '
4
Public knowledge is not intimate knowledge. All public knowledge deals in
stereotypes and generalizations, so that all individuals who become the subject
of public knowledge risk misrepresentation. Rosen rightly expresses concern
about this issue, but the question is how the issue relates to privacy. Senator
John Glenn can become stereotyped as a hero because of his public duties as an
astronaut; Michael Milkin can become stereotyped as a villain because of his
public financial shenanigans. Most persons desire to define themselves and to
have others accept their self-definition. But this desire is incompatible with the
ways in which public discussion necessarily appropriates the authority and the
power to define persons that are the subject of public consideration. Public
debate defines persons for its own purposes, and in its own ways. Judged from
the perspective of intimate knowledge or of personal self-presentation, these
public definitions almost always consist of stereotypes and generalizations. This
12. Id. at 219.
13. Id. at 223.
14. Id.
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is true whether or not the information that forms the basis for public knowledge
is private or public.
Perhaps it might be said, however, that stereotypes based upon private
information are more hurtful to persons than stereotypes based upon public
information. If this is true, it cannot be because privacy uniquely protects the
abstract right to define oneself as something more than a stereotype, because
this right, if it exists, is equally compromised by every absorption of a person
into the maw of public knowledge. It must instead be true either because it is
particularly important to individuals to resist misjudgments based upon private
information, or because it is particularly hurtful to individuals to be misjudged
based upon private information. But there is no reason to accept either proposi-
tion.
Persons normally stake their identity both on aspects of themselves that are
public, like their work, and on aspects of themselves that are private, like their
sexuality. I do not see any reason to believe a priori that it is necessarily more
important to avoid public misjudgments of my work than of my private life. It
would seem instead important to avoid misrepresentation with respect to all
significant aspects of my life. The harm of public stereotyping, moreover, would
seem normally to depend on the content of a stereotype, rather than on the
source of information upon which a stereotype is based. If I am publicly
stereotyped as a liar, it is equally harmful whether the stereotype comes from
public statements made to the police or from private statements made to my
friend.
It is true that if I am publicly stereotyped as a liar on the basis of private
statements to a friend, it may be difficult to defend myself in public without
further compromising my privacy. This difficulty arises because of a conflict
- between desiring a certain public image and a reluctance to disclose private
information. But this same dilemma can arise whether or not the initial public
stereotype is formed on the basis of private information. If on the basis of public
information the public forms an inaccurate and stereotyped image of me as a
poor teacher, I can face the same hard choice about whether to combat the
image by revealing otherwise private exchanges with my students. To the extent
that private information is relevant to the formation of public image, persons
can be put to the test of whether they care more about their privacy or about
their image.
But what does it mean, then, for persons to care about their "privacy"? We
might begin our consideration of this question by noting that, regardless of its
impact on my public image, I suffer an independent and additional harm if my
friend discloses my private conversation to the press. This is not the harm of
being "unfairly defined by isolated pieces of information that have been taken
out of context."' 5 It is instead the injury of betrayal, which is an entirely
different matter. The injury of betrayal comes from the violation of confidence.
15. Id. at 158.
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An analogous sense of violation can arise if my private conversation with a
friend is secretly taped by a third party, like a reporter, who then discloses it to
the press. Instead of tying the concept of privacy to potential errors in the
creation of public knowledge, therefore, it may be more useful to explore the
connections between privacy and the independent harm of violation.
This harm derives from the rupture of significant normative expectations.
These expectations can range from mutual understandings of confidentiality
between friends to assumptions that third parties will not record and disclose
private conversations. We can conceive privacy as identifying socially sanc-
tioned expectations of this kind. On this account, privacy inheres in social
norms that define the forms of respect that we owe to each other. These norms
are socialized into the identities of persons. Infringements of these norms are
experienced as intrinsically harmful, because they are violative of the self. 16
Rosen alludes to this second concept of privacy when he writes in the
Prologue that an invasion of privacy can constitute "an intrinsic offense
against individual dignity."' 17 An offense is "intrinsic" when it causes harm
regardless of contingent consequences, like public misrepresentations. And
offenses against "individual dignity" differ from offenses against "individual
autonomy."' 8 Autonomy refers to the ability of persons to create their own
identity and in this way to define themselves. Dignity, by contrast, refers to "our
sense of ourselves as commanding (attitudinal) respect."' 9 Unlike autonomy,
dignity depends upon intersubjective norms that define the forms of conduct
that constitute respect between persons. That is why modem legal systems so
often set autonomy and dignity in opposition to each other, as for example in
the area of bioethics:
In the name of dignity of the person, French law basically refuses the
individual the right to dispose of his or her body and its parts; American law
has allowed greater latitude for proprietary and commercial relations concern-
ing the body and person, privileging autonomy and value over an inherent and
inalienable dignity. Autonomy contra dignity, dignity contra autonomy, antino-
mies linked in an uneasy seesaw, with neither tradition totally eliminating
what the other valorizing.
20
To equate privacy with dignity is to ground privacy in social forms of respect
that we owe each other as members of a common community. So understood,
privacy presupposes persons who are socially embedded, whose identity and
16. For a full discussion of this account of privacy, see Robert Post, Rereading Warren and
Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991); Robert Post, The
Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957
(1989) [hereinafter Post, Social Foundations].
17. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 19.
18. For other references in The Unwanted Gaze to privacy as protecting dignity, see id. at 12-17, 94.
19. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 15 (1989).
20. PAUL RABINOW, FRENCH DNA: TROUBLE IN PURGATORY 93 (1999).
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self-worth depend upon the performance of social norms, the violation of which
constitutes "intrinsic" injury. In these respects, the conception of privacy as a
form of dignity is in theoretical and practical tension with Rosen's observation
that "[t]he ideal of privacy ... insists that individuals should be allowed to
define themselves.'
If privacy is conceived as a form of dignity, it presupposes a particular kind
of social structure in which persons are joined by common norms that govern
the forms of their social interactions. These norms constitute the decencies of
civilization. Although much of our social life occurs within such a social
structure, we also inhabit many kinds of social structures that are quite different.
Privacy does not typically obtain between surgeons and their patients, for
example, because the social structure of a hospital is instrumentally organized
around the task of making patients healthy. Surgeons typically regard their
patients as bodies to be healed, rather than as persons deserving of reciprocal
norms of respect. Similarly, privacy does not typically obtain between historians
and the objects of their investigation, because historians regard their subjects as
objects to be understood, rather than as selves who are to be respected.
Sometimes public discussion provides an occasion for reaffirming member-
ship in a common community; in such contexts norms defining decency (and
privacy) are ordinarily observed. 2 A good example might be law school faculty
meetings. But in large, impersonal democracies like the United States, public
debate frequently has a different purpose, which is to understand public matters
and hold public officials accountable.2 3 When public discourse is conducted for
this purpose, persons become the object of investigation. They are to be
apprehended, rather than respected.24 That is one reason why persons caught in
the "pitiless glare" of public attention typically feel naked and demeaned. It is
one cause of the "sense of violation" that 'Monica Lewinsky undoubtedly
experienced. It is degrading to be mercilessly questioned and probed in ways
that are unbounded by the forms of respect that usually govern our lives. Caught
in the crosshairs of such public discussion, the loss of privacy derives from a
social structure that follows the imperatives of knowledge, rather than the
decencies of community norms. In such a context, the value of privacy must
thus be set against the value of public comprehension.
21. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 223. The matter is complicated, however, because some forms of
privacy, particularly those associated with spatial norms and protected by the tort of intrusion, are
essential for the formation of an independent self. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 16, at
973-74. This does not tend to be true with informational privacy, which is protected by the tort of public
disclosure. See id. at 986-87.
22. For a legal description of this concept of public debate, see Robert Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV. 603, 627-33 (1990).
23. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 16, at 998-1008.
24. See id. at 999-1003.
25. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 8.
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An analogous tension occurs when the state mobilizes to investigate and
prosecute crime. Rosen eloquently discusses the many ways that law enforce-
ment can degrade the very citizens it is designed to protect. Law enforcement
follows an instrumental logic designed to deter and punish criminal behavior.
From the vantage of this objective, the dignitary norms of privacy are merely
hindrances and burdens. The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
precisely hampers the efficiency of law enforcement in order to extract rudimen-
tary acknowledgements of the privacy norms of our community. In such a
context, the value of privacy must be set against the value of effective crime
control. There can be no final resolution of this tension. The steady and more or
less unconscious erosion of privacy before the daily and pressing imperatives of
crime control can, however, be ietarded and perhaps even checked. That is why
Rosen is right to call for "more independent mechanisms for protecting privacy-
such as grand juries or other popular accountable bodies-which can balance
the claims of the police against the privacy of individuals and decide whether a
search is reasonable before information is disclosed.,
2 6
These balancing mechanisms would be quite pointless if, as Rosen sometimes
suggests, constitutional efforts to interpret the Fourth Amendment to protect
"reasonable expectations of privacy" were "entirely circular."'2 7 It is undoubt-
edly true that judicial interpretations of "reasonable expectations" will affect the
actions of law enforcement agencies, which will in turn affect the actual social
norms that define privacy. These matters are dialectical and thus involve some
circularity. But it is not true that social norms are entirely a product of legal
action. Rosen himself acknowledges this when he appeals to "the kind of
privacy that citizens expect in the real world ' 2 8 as a ground of critiquing
judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment. If privacy is understood
as a form of dignity, there can ultimately be no other measure of privacy than
the social norms that actually exist in our civilization.
Privacy as dignity locates privacy in precisely the aspects of social life that
are shared and mutual. Invading privacy causes injury because we are socialized
to experience common norms as essential prerequisites of our own identity and
self-respect. This understanding of privacy contrasts sharply with yet a third
notion of privacy that is also discussed in the Prologue to The Unwanted Gaze.
In discussing how sexual harassment law has diminished privacy, Rosen sug-
gests that "[p]rivacy protects a space for negotiating legitimately different views
of the good life, freeing people from the constant burden of justifying their
differences.,, 29 Rosen contends that "we should preserve private spaces for
those activities about which there are legitimately varying views, activities that
no one in a civilized society should be forced to submit to public scrutiny.",
30
26. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id. at 61.
29. Id. at 24.
30. Id.
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The ultimate justification for this kind of privacy, as Rosen elsewhere acknowl-
edges, is liberal freedom: "A liberal state respects the distinction between public
and private speech because it recognizes that the ability to expose in some
contexts parts of our identity that we conceal in other contexts is indispensable
to freedom.
31
From a theoretical point of view, this third concept of privacy as freedom is
an almost exact inversion of the concept of privacy as dignity. Privacy as
freedom presupposes difference, rather than mutuality. It contemplates a space
in which social norms are suspended, rather than enforced. It imagines persons
as autonomous and self-defining, rather than as socially embedded and tied
together through common socialization into shared norms.
Of course, real persons in the real world possess selves that are both
independent and socially dependent. In fact, the American sociologist George
Herbert Mead proposed a theory of the self that precisely depended upon the
phased interaction of these two aspects of the self. Mead distinguished between
what he called the "I" and what he called the "me." Mead identified the
socialized structure of individual personality with the "me." He was quite
aware, however, that there could be no such thing as a completely "institutional-
ized individual. 3 a Persons always retain the inherent and irreducible capacity
to modify or transcend socially given aspects of themselves. Mead identified
this capacity as the "I":
The "I" is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the "me"
is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The
attitudes of the others constitute the organized "me," and then one reacts
toward that as an q.,,3
3
The "I" is spontaneous, unpredictable, and formless; the "me" is structured and
relatively static. Mead viewed each as a fundamental and indispensable aspect
of the self. He associated the "me" with "social control," and the "I" with
"self-expression. 3 4 "Taken together, they constitute a personality as it appears
in social experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with these
two distinguishable phases. 35
Privacy as dignity protects the "me"; privacy as freedom protects the "I."
Privacy as dignity safeguards the socialized aspects of the self; privacy as
freedom safeguards the spontaneous, independent, and uniquely individual
aspects of the self. Each seems necessary in a civilized society, but they are also
incompatible with each other. Privacy as dignity seeks to eliminate differences
by bringing all persons within the bounds of a single normalized community;
31. Id. at 11.
32. GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 239 (Anselm Strauss ed., 1964).
33. Id. at 230.
34. Id. at 238, 240.
35. Id. at 238.
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privacy as freedom protects individual autonomy by nullifying the reach of that
community. Privacy as freedom carves out a space in which, as Rosen else-
where states, individuals can be "allowed to define themselves.,
36
Privacy as freedom used to be associated with nature. As Richard Sennett has
observed, traditionally the "line between public and private was essentially one
on which the claims of civility-epitomized by cosmopolitan, public behavior-
were balanced against the claims of nature--epitonized by the family."'37 From
this perspective, privacy as freedom was a sphere of spontaneous, authentic
personal liberty that lay behind the constraints of social norms and obligations.
Modem commentators, however, have tended to cast privacy as freedom more
politically, viewing it as a sphere of liberty from government regulation, rather
than from social norms generally. This classically liberal vision is, in fact,
conceptually related to the "right to privacy" recognized by the Court in Roe v.
Wade.
3 8
The question of the proper nature and extent of state regulation has of course
spawned an enormous literature. 39 Rosen is especially concerned with state
regulation of sexual harassment in the workplace. This is an important and
complex issue, and Rosen is undoubtedly correct to note that it entails signifi-
cant legal intrusion into relationships between the sexes. But the question of
whether this intrusion is justified cannot be settled merely by adding up the
costs to which the concept of privacy as freedom alerts us. As with any issue of
state regulation, the costs of state interference must be measured against the
consequences of failing to intervene. With its sharp focus on privacy, The
Unwanted Gaze does not seriously canvass the latter.
Rosen's suggestion that sexual harassment law might simply be replaced by a
privacy tort is theoretically interesting, but practically undeveloped. Rosen is
right to notice that sexual harassment law understands itself as (in part) prohibit-
ing "a hostile or abusive work environment,, 40 which it defines in moral terms
that circle around normative concepts like "intimidation, ridicule, and insult. 41
These concepts are closely related to the civility norms that privacy as dignity
safeguards.42 Indeed, in the context of workplace racial harassment, the tort of
36. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 223.
37. RICHARD SENNETr, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN: ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 18
(1978).
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But cf ROSEN, supra note 1, at 15 (arguing that in Roe "the justices were
using privacy as a clumsy metaphor for rights of reproductive choice" ).
39. Compare PATRICK DEVLtN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959) (arguing that the law must
enforce Christian morality), with H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963) (arguing that
governments need not and should not enforce popular morality).
40. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
41. Id. at 65.
42. See generally Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding
of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is sociologically akin to a
privacy tort,43 has been used to impose liability on outrageous utterances.4"
But to argue that "speech and conduct that ... employees may find offensive,
but that [do not] change the terms and conditions of employment, should be
regulated by invasion of privacy law rather than by employment discrimination
law,",45 is to bring the relationship between the sexes within the workplace
under the control of "the social norms of decency or propriety" 46 legally
enforced by privacy as dignity. This is just as inconsistent with the sphere of
autonomy protected by privacy as freedom as are the regulations of antidiscrimi-
nation law. In each case, individual speech and conduct is subject to legal
review and liability. The distinction between Rosen's preferred solution and our
current sexual harassment law thus cannot be that the latter blurs "the bound-
aries of the public and private spheres,"' 7 while the former does not. The
difference is that antidiscrimination law limits individual liberty in the interest
of achieving specified social goals, whereas privacy torts limit individual liberty
in the interest of enforcing common social norms.4 8
This difference suggests why privacy torts cannot simply be substituted for
antidiscrimination law. Contemporary sexual harassment law differs from pri-
vacy law in that the former places civility norms within the context of a strong
commitment to a "broad rule of workplace equality"49 that asks whether
violations of civility norms are so severe and asymmetrical as to constitute
"discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex."5° Privacy law has no such focus on
the systematic consequences of privacy violations. This suggests that privacy
torts can supplement sexual harassment law, but they cannot supplant it. The
purposes and foci of the two forms of regulation are ultimately distinct.
Antidiscrimination law seeks to alter social norms and practices, whereas
privacy torts seek to enforce them. In this important respect, antidiscrimination
43. See Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social
Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV, at 163, 168-69 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro
eds., 1993); Post, supra note 22, at 616-26.
44. See, e.g., Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) (holding that an
employer's use of racial slurs and other outrageous language in the workplace may support an
employee's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
45. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 94-95.
46. Id. at 115.
47. Id. at 107.
48. To use terminology that I have elsewhere developed, the difference is that antidiscrimination law
creates a "managerial" regime, whereas privacy torts attempt to instantiate a particular vision of
"community." For a discussion of the distinction between these two forms of law, see ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 3-6, 10-15 (1995).
49. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
50. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) (holding that Title VII does
not merely impose "a general civility code," because violations of civility are by themselves insufficient
to justify liability-the violations must also amount to discrimination).
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law differs from privacy law.5' The latter protects dignity, but does not necessar-
ily prevent discrimination.
When feminists claim that the "personal is political," the point is that areas of
social life previously closed off from state regulation because deemed important
for the development of free individuality actually function to dominate and
oppress persons. The argument is that state intervention is necessary to avoid
injustice. Antidiscrimination law is typically justified in this way. It is true that
the enforcement of antidiscrimination law carries costs, and Rosen has admira-
bly specified the ways in which these costs can add up in contemporary sexual
harassment law. But a final judgment on the question of retaining that law
would require an equally careful and comprehensive specification of the conse-
quences of failing to intervene. Substituting a privacy tort for sexual harassment
law will not eliminate these consequences. The concept of privacy as freedom is
thus useful in alerting us to the costs of regulation, but it cannot settle the
question of whether regulation is necessary or advisable. Privacy as freedom
emphasizes what is lost by state regulation; it does not begin to specify what is
gained.
51. I would also note that antidiscrimination law is presently enforced by agencies as well as by
private suits. Whether an enforcement scheme that relies entirely upon private litigation, as do privacy
torts, would adequately substitute for the enforcement mechanisms of our present antidiscrimination
law is another serious question that requires thoughtful analysis.
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